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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT 
The parties in the district court were Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, Steven Williams, Kyle 
W i lliams and J. Richard Williams. Appellant Lucille T. Williams is a non-party seeking 
intervention. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
GOVERNING LAW 
The following statutory provisions are involved in the outcome of this appeal: Rule 
24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
QUESTION PRESENTED AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred when it denied the Motion 
to Intervene filed by Appellant, Lucille T. Williams, in the trial court case. The court of 
appeals reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion to intervene de novo. In re: Marriage 
of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074 (Utah 2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
1. On or about December 5, 1995 a complaint was filed in the Third 
District Court by Plaintiff Malualani B. Hoopiiaina against Defendants Steven Williams, 
Kyle Williams and J. Richard Williams seeking to enjoin defendants from interfering with 
a right of way over property located at 345 West 700 South in Salt Lake City, Utah (the 
"Property"). In the district court action the plaintiff alleged that he owned a right of way 
"over real property of the defendants described as Lot 5, Block 12, Plat "A" . . . for a 
perpetual right of way of a spur track crossing the property of defendants." (R. 1-3). 
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2. Neither Lucille Williams nor the Lucille T. Williams Trust was named 
as a defendant in the district court action. (R. 1-3). 
3. On April 23, 2002 trial was conducted. (R. 272-273). 
4. The Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler ruled that the parties had 30 
days to provide her with information regarding the proper parties to the proceedings and that 
the obstructions on the easement were to be moved out of the way within 90 days. (R. 272-
273). 
5. On May 23,2002, one month after the trial, defendants filed a post trial 
Motion to Dismiss asking the court to dismiss the action on the basis that although 
defendants Steve Williams and Kyle Williams had once owned the Property over which the 
easement in question passed, prior to the trial (on July 12, 2001) the Property had been 
conveyed to Lucille T. Williams as trustee for the Lucille T. Williams Trust. Defendants 
further alleged that the information regarding the true owner of the Property had not been 
discovered until after the trial. On this basis, defendants argued that the action before the 
trial court should be dismissed because the defendants were not the owners of the Property. 
(R. 304-366). 
6. On July 25, 2002 plaintiffs submitted to the trial court a Notice to 
Submit for Decision asking the court to enter Findings of Fact and deny defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss. (R. 382-383). 
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7. On August 13, 2002, Judge Sandra N. Peuler, denied defendants' post 
trial Motion to Dismiss, finding that the defendants in the action "acknowledged" that they 
were the owners of the Property over which the easement in question ran and that they were 
the parties who had denied plaintiffs access to the easement and that they were, therefore, 
"estopped from denying an interest in the property." (R. 388-390). 
8. On September 3,2002, Lucille Williams filed an Affidavit with the trial 
court stating that she was currently and had been at the time of trial, the owner of the 
Property as Trustee for the Lucille T. Williams Trust. (R. 479-486). 
9. On September 4,2002, defendants filed an Objection to Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree and Request for Additional Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Request for Oral Argument, asking the court to decline 
making a ruling which effected the property rights of a non-party to the action, Lucille 
Williams, and reiterating that the information regarding the true owner of the Property was 
not discovered until after trial on the matter. (R. 397-459). 
10. On September 12, 2002, plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs5 Response to 
Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree and 
Request for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Request for Oral 
Argument arguing that defendants were estopped from arguing that they were the wrong 
parties to the litigation because they had represented in the pleadings that the Property was 
"theirs." (R. 499-510). 
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11. On October 10, 2002, the court ordered that oral argument be had 
regarding the dispute over the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
hearing was set for October 31, 2002. (R. 561-562). 
12. On October 30,2002, Lucille Williams, through counsel, filed a Motion 
to Intervene and Memorandum in Support thereof requesting intervention as the owner of the 
Property effected by the court's ruling. (R. 584-586, 588-613). 
13. On December 6, 2002, the trial court issued a Minute Entry denying 
Lucille Williams' Motion to Intervene, finding that the motion was filed too late as the matter 
had been "concluded through trial." (R. 896-897). 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. At the time of trial before Judge Sandra N. Peuler, the named 
defendants had no right or interest in the Property which was the subject of the litigation. 
The Property was then owned by Lucille T. Williams, Trustee of the Lucille T. Williams 
Trust. (R. 597-613; 479-486). 
2. The right of way easement for spur track which was the subject of 
the litigation in the trial court crosses over the Property owned by Lucille T. Williams, 
Trustee for the Lucille T. Williams Trust. (R. 597-613). 
3. Lucille Williams was not a party to the proceedings before the trial 
court or any other proceeding involving the Property and has never been represented by 
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an attorney with regard to issues or proceedings involving the Property until her attempt 
to intervene. (R. 479-486). 
4. At the time the action was commenced in the trial court and during 
the entire course of the litigation before the trial court, Lucille Williams understood that 
there was a dispute between Cuma Hoopiiaina and defendants to this action; however, she 
had no understanding of the details or substance of the proceedings and no understanding 
of the effect that they would have upon her interests. Such matters were being handled by 
her husband and his attorneys. (R. 479-486). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The litigation before the trial court involved the use of an easement or right of way 
which was allegedly owned by the plaintiff, Malualani Hoopiiaina, and over property 
allegedly owned by the named defendants, Steven Williams, Kyle Williams and J. 
Richard Williams. A trial was conducted on April 23, 2002. After trial, while the parties 
were submitting proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, counsel for the 
defendants discovered, through title search, several deeds and other documents which 
clearly established that the Property over which the easement in question ran was, in fact, 
owned by Lucille Williams as Trustee of the Lucille T. Williams Trust. Defendants 
moved to dismiss the action and filed objected to proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law based upon this newly discovered evidence. On September 3, 2002 
Lucille Williams filed an Affidavit with the trial court stating that she, as Trustee of the 
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Lucille T. Williams Trust, was the owner of the Property which was the subject of the 
litigation. (R. 479-486). On October 30, 2002, Lucille Williams also filed with the trial 
court a Motion to Intervene based upon Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 584-
586). The trial court ruled, On December 6, 2002, that it was too late for Lucille 
Williams to seek intervention based upon the fact that a trial had already been conducted 
and denied the motion. (R. 896-897). 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for intervention by right (24(a)) 
or by leave of court (24(b)). Application of Rule 24 clearly mandates that the trial court 
erred in denying Lucille Williams' Motion to Intervene. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a right of non-parties to 
intervene in certain actions. Rule 24 provides intervention of a non-party by right (24(a)) 
or permission (24(b)). 
"The purpose of Rule 24 is to eliminate unnecessary duplication of litigation.'1 
Centurian Corp. v. Cripps. 577 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1978). Because Rule 24 is intended 
to promote fairness, economy and efficiency injudicial administration, it is the better 
practice to "apply the rule relating to intervention in such a way that, whenever possible 
and 'compatible with efficiency and due process,' issues relating to the same transaction 
can be resolved in the same lawsuit" O'Hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Housing 
Systems. Inc.. 595 P.2d 679, 687 (Colo. 1979). Therefore, the Utah Rule governing 
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intervention should be liberally construed in favor of intervention to achieve the purpose 
of eliminating unnecessary litigation. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 284 (Utah 1982) 
A. Lucille Williams Had a Right Under Rule 24(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to Intervene in the Action Before the Trial Court Even After 
Trial Had Occurred. 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
Intervention of Right. Upon timely application, anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of 
the action and his is so situated that the disposition of the action may 
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
1. Utah Code Ann. $ 78-34-7 Provides Statutory Justification for 
Intervention as a Matter of Right. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-34-7 provides, in pertinent part: 
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in, 
any of the property described in the Complaint, or in the damage for 
the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead and defend, 
each in respect to his own property or interest, or that claimed by 
him, in the same manner as if named in the Complaint. § 78-34-7, 
UCA(1953). 
It is undisputed that Lucille Williams, as trustee for the Lucille T. Williams trust, 
"claims an interest in the damage for the taking" of the Property at issue in the trial court 
action. When an intervening party may establish a valid interest in real property which is 
or will be affected by the determination in a pending case, the movant should be allowed 
to intervene. See, generally. State v. Tedesco. 4 Utah 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955). Lucille 
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Williams' position is directly addressed by the language of § 78-34-7 and she should have 
been allowed to intervene on that basis. 
2. Lucille Williams Had an Interest in the Property at Issue Which May 
Be Impaired as a Result of the Trial Court Proceedings Which Was 
Not Adequately Represented by Existing Parties to the Litigation. 
The action before the trial court had the potential to and the effect of impairing 
Lucille Williams' ability to protect her interest in the Property. In Lima v. Chambers, 657 
P.2d 279 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court should consider 
whether the movant "is or may be bound by a judgment in the litigation" then liberally 
construe the application of Rule 24(a) in an effort to eliminate unnecessary duplication of 
litigation. Id. at 282. The Utah Supreme Court has defined the nature of the interest 
necessary to permit intervention as follows: "[t]o justify intervention [as of right], the 
party seeking [it] must demonstrate a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation 
such that the intervenor's rights may be affected, for good or for ill." Lima, 657 P.2d at 
282. 
With respect to the interest requirement, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
declared that intervention is a matter of right when a party's interest "can be established, 
preserved, or enforced in no other way than by determination and action by that court [in 
which the action is pending]." Tulsa Rock Co. v. Williams, 640 P.2d 530, 532 (Okla. 
1982). 
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Lucille Williams has sufficient direct interest in the subject matter of the instant 
case to permit intervention as of right. Intervention in the trial court action, even after 
trial, is compatible with efficiency and due process. Lucille Williams' only means of ade-
quately pursuing and enforcing her property interest is through intervention in the trial 
court case. 
Further, Lucille William's interest is not and has not been adequately represented 
by existing parties. Adequacy of representation turns on whether there is an identity or 
divergence of interests between a movant and the original parties. Lima, 657 P.2d at 283. 
In the instant case, Lucille Williams' interests diverge from those of all other parties to 
the litigation regarding the Property. 
Whether interests are in line or divergent is key in determining if a party should 
be allowed to intervene. Lima, supra, at 283. It is not disputed that Lucille William's" 
husband and son are parties to the litigation before the trial court; however, they do not 
hold the same interest at Lucille Williams. Further, it is undisputed that she was not 
aware of the details of the litigation before the trial. (R. 479-486). Lucille Williams1 
interests were never adequately represented by existing parties. An application to 
intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, must be granted 
if the elements are met. Lucille Williams met the required elements and the trial court 
erred in denying her request to intervene. 
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The parties to this action may assert that Lucille William's Motion to Intervene is 
untimely. Timeliness is determined under the facts of each case. See, 37 A.L.R.2d 1296 
(indicating that intervention may be timely even after judgment). The most important 
factor in evaluating timeliness is whether there has been any apparent delay that 
prejudices the other parties to the action. Jenner v. Real Estate Services. 659 P.2d 1072, 
1073 (Utah 1983). There is no prejudice to any party in the instant case from an 
application for intervention because there are two other pending cases which must be 
resolved to fully determine the rights of the parties.1 
Further, the parties hereto should not be allowed to benefit from the fact that they 
knew of Lucille Williams' interest in the Property, but improperly failed to name her as a 
party hereto or to inform the trial court of her interest. The parties hereto, although in 
frequent contact with Lucille Williams, have not apprized her of the details of these 
proceedings and the impact that these proceedings will undoubtedly have on her rights. 
In light of these circumstances the trial court erred in failing to consider the facts 
contributing to the delay in making the motion as well as the prejudice which would result 
to the movant if intervention is not allowed. Jenner at 1073. 
B. Lucille Williams May Intervene Permissively under Rule 24(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 24(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part: 
1
 Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan, et al. v. Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, et aL Civil No. 
020910872 PR and Probate No. 023901215 TR. 
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Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a 
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in 
common. . . . 
Lucille Williams' right to intervene under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 is set forth 
above. Clearly, with the issues involved in this litigation, the request for relief and this 
Court's ruling ordering tear down of the building on the Property, this action and any 
subsequent action filed by Lucille Williams share common claims and defenses and have 
virtually identical questions of fact and law. Further, because of the irreversible damage 
which will be done in light of the relief ordered, i.e., tear down of the building located on 
the Property, it was fundamentally unfair to not permit Lucille Williams to intervene. If 
the Court's order (not yet complied with) is complied with and Lucille Williams is not 
allowed to intervene, irreparable damage will have been done with regard to the building. 
On this basis alone, her intervention should have been permitted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Lucille T. Williams requests that this 
court remand this matter to the trial court. 
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DATED this 9th day of July, 2004. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
VpN-
iael Re Carlstbn 
DunyoiK_y 
Attorneys for Intervenor Lucille Williams. 
N:\2I553\l\Appeal Brief.wpd 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am an attorney at the law offices of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, attorneys for defendants herein; that I served the attached Brief of Appellant 
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